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Abstract. The relationship between social segregation and workplace 
segregation had been traditionally studied as a one-way causal relationship 
mediated by referral hiring. In this paper we introduce an alternative framework 
which describes the dynamic relationships between social segregation, 
workplace segregation, individuals’ homophily levels, and referral hiring. An 
agent-based simulation model was developed based on this framework. The 
model describes the process of continuous change in composition of workplaces 
and social networks of agents, and how this process affects levels of workplace 
segregation and segregation of social networks of the agents (people). The 
results of the simulation model include: (1) social segregation and workplace 
segregation may co-evolve even when hiring of workers occurs mainly through 
formal channels and population is initially integrated (2) majority groups tend 
to be more homophilous than minority groups, and (3) referral hiring may be 
beneficial for minority groups when the population is highly segregated.  
Keywords: social networks, segregation, referral hiring, agent-based 
simulation. 
1 Introduction 
According to the contact hypothesis [1], more contact between different social 
(ethnic, racial and/or religious) groups would promote tolerance and social 
integration. When social networks of people become segregated and homophilous the 
chance of their contacts to cross their groups’ boundaries is reduced. Similarly, 
workplace segregation may also reduce the chance of inter-group contact. In addition 
to these negative social effects, workplace segregation may have negative economic 
consequences. For example it may introduce high levels of income and employment 
inequality between different groups in the society ([4], [8], [10], [18]). Besides, 
workplace segregation may affect the whole economic system through its effects on 
the efficiency allocating workers to jobs [2]. 
Referral hiring (hiring through the use of social or familial contacts), has been 
considered the main source of workplace segregation. Granovetter ([9], [10]) found 
that more than half of workers in the U.S. knew about their jobs through informal 
methods (friends, relatives, and other social contacts). In a recent study conducted by 
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the authors about workplace and social segregation in Egypt1, 65 percent of workers 
and 54 percent of employers depend on these informal methods of employment. 
Besides, the homophily hypothesis implies that people are more likely to create social 
ties with similar others, or “birds of a feather flock together” [14]. This similarity 
among network actors may be evaluated, among other factors, on the basis of race, 
religion and ethnicity. Thus when using social networks to search for jobs, it is more 
probably that people will have job information from others of the same ethnicity, race 
and/or religion as their own, and this may promote workplace segregation.  
According to the pervious analysis, researchers have studied the relationship 
between social segregation (segregation in the social networks of different ethnic, 
racial and/or religious groups) and workplace segregation as a one-way causal 
relationship. In this relationship, the independent variable, traditionally, was the level 
of social segregation and the dependent variable was the level of workplace 
segregation, with the level of referral hiring as moderating variable (see for example 
[5], [17] and [18]).  
However, empirical literature (for example [11]) confirms that high percentage of 
our social relations comes from organizations (like workplaces). So, these 
organizations contribute to the construction of the pool of candidates whom people 
might create social relations with. Thus, when this pool becomes segregated this 
would promote social segregation and vice versa. This argument implies that 
workplace segregation can affect (as well as be affected by) social segregation. 
In this paper we introduce a general framework to study the dynamic relationships 
between social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, and referral 
hiring where each variable may affect the others. To test the validity of this 
framework, an agent-based simulation model for the labour market was developed. 
The model creates an artificial society where agents (people) use their social networks 
to search for jobs. As simulation time passes, agents change their social networks by 
creating new social links (ties) with each other while some other links dissolve. Also, 
the composition of workplaces (the proportion of workers from different societal 
groups) may change through the processes of firing and hiring of workers. The 
presented model describes this process of continuous changes in composition of 
workplaces and social networks of agents, and how this process affects levels of 
workplace segregation and segregation of the social networks of agents.  
After this introduction, we introduce the proposed framework for the relationship 
between social segregation and workplace segregation in section 2. Then in section 3 
the agent-based simulation model is presented. The results of the simulation model 
are discussed in section 4, and finally section 5 presents the conclusion. 
2 General Framework for the Relationship between Social 
Segregation and Workplace Segregation 
As summarized in Fig. 1, social segregation may affect workplace segregation (each 
arrow in Fig. 1 indicates positive causal relationships between the variables at its two 
                                                          
1
 Egypt can be divided, according to religion, to a majority Muslim population and a minority 
Coptic Christians (about 10 percent of total population). 
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sides). When firms tend to hire new workers through referrals, especially referrals 
from other existing worker (insider referrals), and when social networks of people 
tend to be segregated, this would promote workplaces segregation. On the other hand 
when workplaces become segregated this would reduce the chance for people from 
different social groups to meet and create social relations at work, and this would 
increase social segregation. 
Individual’s homophily2 level works as biasness towards creating social ties with 
similar others. So, higher levels of homophily would coincide with higher level of 
social segregation. On the other hand, when social networks of people become less 
segregated this means that they have higher chance to have contacts with others of 
different groups, and this would hinder their homophilous attitudes.  
The relationship between homophily levels and workplace segregation can be 
described as follows. Individuals’ homophily level may affect workplace segregation 
through its effects on exit patterns of workers and hiring discrimination. As empirical 
studies show (for example [16]), workers with high levels of homophily tend to stay 
longer in segregated workplaces where their groups are over-represented than other 
workplaces. Also, higher homophily levels among employers would promote hiring 
discrimination (employers’ preferences to hire workers of the same social group as 
their own [2]), and this would increase workplace segregation. In return, workplace 
segregation may affect homophily levels of individuals. Segregated workplaces 
reduce the chance for inter-group contact to happen, which promotes homophilous 
attitudes and vice versa. 
 
3 Agent-Based Simulation Model 
Based on the proposed framework presented in the previous section, we present an 
agent-based model which describes the dynamic relationship between the main 
variables: social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, and referral 
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 “Homophily is the principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than 
among dissimilar people” ([14], p. 416). 
Exit patterns 
And 
Hiring Discrimination 
 
Social Segregation 
 
Workplace Segregation 
 
Homophily Levels 
 
Referral Hiring 
 
Inter-group contact 
 
Chance for inter-group social ties 
 
Homophilous Social Networks 
Inter-group contact 
 
Fig. 1. The proposed framework to study the relationship between social segregation and 
workplace segregation.  
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hiring. First, we describe the model’s specification then we discuss some of the 
simulation results. 
3.1 Agents  
The model creates an artificial society of N equally-qualified agents (persons). Each 
agent can belong to one of two different social groups: A or B (simply we call them 
Red and Green). Assume that A (Red) is the minority group, and its proportion in the 
society is P (where 0<P<0.5).  
3.2 Social Networks 
Social Network is a “...set of people who are most likely to be sources of a variety of 
rewarding interactions, such as discussing a personal problem, borrowing money, or 
social recreation” ([13], p. 78). Each agent has it own ego-centric social network. For 
each agent, the maximum possible size of its social network (maximum number of 
alters at one time) is Si, i=1, 2,…, N.  
Homophily Levels. Agents create social links with each other based on their 
homophily levels, hi ∈[0,1]. Agent’s homophily level indicates its biasness to create 
social links with other agents of the same colour (group) as its own. For example, a 
Red agent would create a social link to another Red agent with the following 
probability3: 
Otherwise
0p if
0
)1(
Red)  to(Red Prob >


 −+
=
php
 
(1) 
, and it creates a link to a Green agent with the complement probability. In formula 
(1), (small) p refers to the proportion of Red agents available within the context of link 
creation. For example, when a Red agent joins a workplace, and it is about to create a 
social link to one of the existing co-workers, p would refer to the proportion of other 
Red workers (who are not already in link with the agent) in that workplace. 
Based on formula (1), with h=0, all links are created at random, and all agents will 
have the same probability p to create links with Red agents and the probability 1- p to 
create links with Green agents. With h=1, each agent would create links only with 
other similar agents (if such agents are available otherwise with other agents of 
different colour).  
Agents are initialized with a zero homophily level. However, agent’s homophily 
level changes over time, and it is assumed to depend – in addition to its current level - 
on five factors: (1) composition of its social network, (2) average homophily level of 
alters in its social network, (3) composition of its workplace, (4) average homophily 
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level of its workmates, and (5) overall average homophily of all agents in society. 
Thus, for a Red agent, its homophily level at time t+1, ht+1, can be written as a 
weighted average of its homophily level ht and the effects of these five factors as: 
  
ht+1 = [ht + α1(pn – P)/(1-P) + α2(mean homophily of alters) + α3(pw – P)/(1-P) 
+  α4 (mean homophily of workmates) + α5 (overall mean homophily of 
all agents)] / (1+ α1+ α2+ α3+ α4 +α5) 
(2) 
 
Where ht is agent’s homophily level at time t, pn is the proportion of alters of Red 
colour in agent’s social network, pw proportion of Red workmates, and  α1, α2, α3, α4 
and α5 are constants. 
Directed vs. Undirected Links. In forming their social networks agents create 
directed (asymmetric), rather than undirected (symmetric), social links with each 
other. The reason behind this assumption is the potential asymmetry in the evaluation 
of social links, and the asymmetry in job knowledge and access [17].  
Origins of Social Relations. In line with Fischer [6], agents create social links 
through three sources: workplaces, other friends/relatives (other links) and random 
acquaintances. At each time step of a simulation run, each “working” agent has a 
probability LW to create a social link to one of his co-workers. Also, at each time step, 
each agent has a probability LN to create a new link with another agent through its 
existing social network (in other words, with another agent who is already linked with 
one of agent’s social network). Finally, at each time step, each agent has a probability 
LR to create a new link with another random agent. Finally, to keep the initial 
distribution of links constant among agents, all extra links (more than Si) will be 
removed at random.  
3.3 Workplaces and Jobs 
Our artificial labour market includes a number of firms, F, each has a number of jobs 
(θf). We assume that all the jobs are identical (so, any agent can do any job with the 
same efficiency). Each firm has a “colour” which indicates the group identity of its 
owner/manager (employer). Suppose that proportion of Red firms is P. Hiring 
discrimination for a firm f, Df, is defined as the mean homophily level of its workers 
multiplied by a regulating scalar discrimination-const. Besides, each firm, f, has a 
total of tf agents (workers), which can be divided into rf Red agents and gf Green 
agents, such that tf = rf + gf, and let pf = rf / tf be the proportion of the minority (Red) 
group inside this firm. Finally, let ∑=
f f
tT denote total number of currently working 
agents.  
Hiring Process. At each time step each firm hires a number of agents (workers) to fill 
its vacant jobs. Firms can hire new agents either through referrals from current 
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workers (with probability R) or through formal channels (with probability 1-R). If a 
firm decided to hire a worker through formal methods it would simply pick one of the 
unemployed workers at random.  In case of hiring through referrals from current 
workers, firms may practice hiring discrimination against the candidate workers. Let 
G represents the group of candidate workers, i.e., unemployed workers who have 
social links with at least one of the current workers in the firm (If no such workers 
exist, firms hire through formal channels). For example, a Red firm would hire a Red 
agent through referral with the probability: 
Otherwise
0p if
0
)1(
referral)rough  worker thRed hire  tofirm (Red Prob >


 −+
=
pDp f
 
(3) 
, and it hires a Green agent with the complement probability, where p refers to the 
proportion of Red agents in the group G. 
Firing Process.  At each time step of the simulation run, each working agent will be 
fired from (or will exit) its workplace with some probability. This probability depends 
on agent’s homophily level, h, and how far the proportion of its group inside the 
workplace, p, is from the overall group proportion in the society, P. The probability of 
a Red agent to be fired from its workplace at any time step is given by: 
ER= β(1 + h (P - p) ) (4) 
Where β is a constant regulating the speed of workers’ turnover. For an agent with 
zero-homophily, its probability to be fired would be constant and equals β regardless 
of the proportion, p, of its group in the workplace (which is intuitive). On the other 
hand, an agent with a non-zero homophily, h, would have an increasing probability to 
be fired as its group’s proportion p decreases, and vice versa. 
3.4 Statistics and Indexes 
We are particularly interested in measuring levels of social segregation and workplace 
segregation in addition to employment levels for minority and majority groups.  
Index of Social Segregation. The segregation index, S, developed by Freeman [7]4 is 
used to measure level of social segregation. S measures the deviation of the 
distribution of links between two agents from different groups from the distribution 
expected when links are created at random, and it is given by ([7], p. 416): 



 −
=
0
E(e*)
e*E(e*)
S  (5) 
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 Although Freeman developed this index to measure segregation in social networks with 
undirected links, it can be shown that it is still valid for our case of directed links as well. 
If and only if E(e*)≥e*         
Otherwise 
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Where E(e*) is the expected number of links between two agents from different 
groups under the assumption that links are created at random, and e* is the actual 
number of such links.  
E(e*) is given by (adapted from Freeman [7], p. 416): 
1
)1(2
*)(
−
−
=
N
PNLP
eE  (6) 
Where L is the total number of links in the global social network, and N (number of 
agents) and P (proportion of Red agents) are as defined before.  
Indexes of Workplace Segregation. A modified version of the Gini index, Gˆ , 
developed by Carrington and Troske [3] will be used to measure workplace 
segregation. Gˆ  measures the deviation of the segregation curve from the case of 
randomness (which represents the case in which workers are randomly allocated to 
firms) and is given by Carrington and Troske ([3], p. 406): 
 





<
−
≥
−
−
=
*
*
*
*
*1
*
ˆ
GGif
G
GG
GGif
G
GG
G  (7) 
Where )1(2/ 2
1 1
PPTppttG
F
i
F
j
jiji −∑ ∑ −=
= =
 (8) 
Where G is the calculated standard Gini index ([12], p. 5) and G* is the calculated 
Gini index if the workers (with minority proportion P) were randomly distributed to 
the firms (with given sizes)5.  
The modified Gini index is more suitable, than the standard Gini index or other 
indexes which measure the deviation of the segregation curve from the evenness, for 
our model for two reasons. Firstly, we are interested in simulating a labour market 
with small-to-medium firms (which increases the possibility to get a high Gini index 
with a complete random allocation of workers). Secondly, we are particularly 
interested in measuring the systematic rather than random changes in workplace 
segregation.  
3.5 Model Dynamics 
The simulation starts with creating an artificial society of a number of agents from 
two different groups with a random social network for each agent. A number of firms 
                                                          
5
 G* can be calculated by simulating a random allocation of workers, with given N and P, to a 
number of firms F, with specified size distribution. The value of G* used in subsequent 
sections is the average of value obtained through simulating the random allocation of 
workers to firms in 200 simulation runs. 
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F are created, each with a specified number of jobs θf , and then agents are assigned 
randomly to firms. The final step of the initialization process is to calculate and plot 
statistics for this initial stage, which include mainly indexes of segregation for 
workplaces and social network. Then at each time step: 
1. Each agent will be fired with the proper probability (as described earlier) 
2. Each firm will hire a number of agents, either randomly (through formal channels) 
or through referrals from current workers, depending on the probability R. 
3. Agents update their homophily levels (according to equation (2)) and their social 
networks. Each agent creates a link through workplace (if agent is employed), 
through other links and/or randomly with the proper probabilities (LW, LN  and/or 
LR respectively). 
4. Statistics are calculated and plotted. 
4 Simulation Results 
In the following we summarize the results of the simulation model6 regarding 
workplace segregation, social segregation and unemployment levels of minority and 
majority groups. The results are based on the values of parameters shown in Table 1. 
4.1 Referral Hiring, Workplace Segregation and Social Segregation 
The results summarized in Fig. 2 show the co-evolution of workplace segregation and 
social segregation with different levels of referral hiring. Both workplace segregation 
                                                          
6
 The model is written in Netlogo 4.0 [19] 
7
 The probabilities LW, LN, and LR may not add to one because they are not mutually exclusive. 
Table 1.  Parameters values and description for the simulation model. 
Parameter  Description Value 
General   
Sim-run Number of simulation runs 30  
Sim-time Number of time steps for each simulation run 500 
α1, α2, α3, α4 and α5 constants regulating the change in homophily levels. 0.4 
β A constant regulating the probability of an agent to be fired. 0.1 
Agents   
N Total number of agents 1000 
P Proportion of the minority (Red) group 0.2 
Social Networks   
Si Size of social networks of agents 10 
LW
 7
 
Probability of creating a new link with other co-workers  0.3 
LN Probability of creating a new link through current links 0.4 
LR Probability of creating a new link randomly 0.01 
Workplaces   
F Number of firms 40 
θf Number of jobs in each firm 20 
discrimination-const A regulating scalar for hiring discrimination 1 
 9 
and social segregation increase with increasing level of referral hiring. An interesting 
result is that significant levels of workplace segregation and social segregation may 
evolve even when hiring of workers occurs mainly through formal channels and the 
society is initially integrated. The random allocation of workers to firms may 
introduce some level of workplace segregation which triggers an increasing (but still 
low) level of homophily and social segregation which, in turn, promotes workplace 
segregation (through the exit patterns of workers), and so on. 
 
Fig. 2. Co-evolution of workplace segregation 
(G and Gˆ ) and social segregation (S) for 
different levels of referral hiring (R). 
Fig. 3. Final mean homophily levels for 
minority and majority groups for different 
levels of referral hiring (R). 
4.3 Homophily Levels 
The results of the simulation show that even when we start with a zero-level of 
homophily, agents of majority groups, generally, end with higher homophily levels 
than those of minority groups (as shown in Fig. 3). The main reason behind that is 
minority people have higher chance to have outgroup links (through social networks 
or workplaces) than majority group members. 
4.4 Employment Inequality 
An interesting result of the simulation model is that It seems that, increasing levels of 
referral hiring would be beneficial for minority groups when population is highly 
segregated and harmful otherwise. Fig. 4 shows, minority unemployment generally 
decreases with increasing level of referral hiring until it reaches its minimum level 
(with R=0.8 in our experiment), then increases after that. When referral hiring is low 
(hence, lower levels of workplace and social segregation), all unemployed agents will 
have the same chance to join any workplace with vacant jobs, and will have the same 
probability to exit their workplaces, hence all social groups will have similar 
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unemployment levels (around 20% in our experiment). This is clearly illustrated in 
Fig. 5 with the case of R=0. But with higher levels of referral hiring (the cases R=0.8 
and R=1), minority unemployment tends to be higher than majority unemployment at 
the early stage of simulation run, which is characterized by (still) lower levels of 
workplace and social segregation. However, as time passes and segregation increases 
referral hiring benefits minority’s employment. For example, when R=0.8, minority 
unemployment attains a stationary level of 0.16. When level of referral hiring is close 
to one, a complete segregation of workplaces (and social networks) is reached and the 
firms are distributed proportionally between minority and majority groups, hence all 
groups will have the same unemployment level (0.2). 
This result regarding the relationship between referral hiring and minority 
employment is consistent with the result of Tassier and Menczer’ model [18] where 
they show that: 
“more random social networks [majority groups] yield higher employment rates than 
less random social networks [minority groups] if the population is integrated [in early 
stage of our simulation] or information flows about job vacancies are random  [low 
level of referral hiring]. However if the population is highly segregated and 
information flows about job vacancies are non-random [with high level of referral 
hiring in later stages of simulation run] then less random social networks have higher  
employment rates than more random social networks. This second finding holds 
because non-random social networks allow a group to better contain job information 
inside the group when a population is segregated.” ([18], p. 1)  
 
Fig. 4. Unemployment levels of minority 
group for different levels of referral hiring, R. 
Fig. 5. Unemployment levels of minority 
group across time with R=0, 0.8 and 1. 
5 Model Validation 
The model’s behaviour was checked against empirical data driven from the Egyptian 
labour market and social networks. Three sources of data was used to estimate 
model’s parameters: Workers’ Status in Industrial Enterprises Survey (WSIES), 
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Social Contract Survey (SCS), and Empirical Data (ED) gathered by the researchers. 
Table 2 presents the estimated values for model’s parameters. 
The results presented in Table 3 show that there a great level of similarities 
between the observed values of the variables and the simulated values. Most of the 
confidence intervals (CI’s) of the difference between of the observed and simulated 
values contain the zero point, indicating that they are not statistically different. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we introduce a general framework which describes the dynamic 
relationships between social segregation, workplace segregation, homophily levels, 
and referral hiring. An agent-based simulation model was developed and the results of 
the model support the proposed framework. The results of the simulation model 
Table 2. Estimated values for model’s parameters based on data about social networks and 
workplaces in Egypt. 
Parameter Name Parameter Value Source 
Minority proportion (P): 0.06 SCS 
Overall unemployment rate 0.13 SCS 
Number of workers (N) 4800 WSIES 
Number of firms (F) 165 WSIES  
Total number of jobs 4176 WSIES 
Number of jobs in each firm (θf) Same distribution as WSIES  WSIES 
Number of Coptic employers 14 WSIES 
Number of Muslim employers 151 WSIES 
discrimination-const 0.7 WSIES 
Level of referral hiring 0.65 ED 
LW, LN and LR 0.3, 0.5, 0.01 (respectively) ED 
Maximum network size  of  agents (Si) Normal (8,3) ED 
Table 3. Comparing observed and simulated values of variables in the simulation model. 
Variable Name Observed Value 
Simulation 
Value 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI of 
Difference 
Social Segregation 0.802 0.796 0.004 (-0.013, 0.001) 
Workplace Segregation - Gini 0.932 0.925 0.003 (-0.0136, 0.0002) 
Muslims unemployment 0.133 0.1334 0.0002 (-0.0008, 0.0009) 
Copts unemployment 0.079 0.074 0.003 (-0.011, 0.002) 
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indicated that labour market may experience significant levels of workplace 
segregation and social segregation even when hiring of workers occurs mainly 
through formal channels. The results also show that majority groups tend to be more 
homophilous than majority groups, and referral hiring may be beneficial for minority 
groups especially when the population is highly segregated, and the relationship 
between referral hiring and minority unemployment is not linear. Finally, the model is 
validated against empirical data from the Egyptian labour market and social networks, 
and there was a great similarity between the observed and simulated results. 
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